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Coalbed Gas Ownership in Pennsylvania-a Tenuous
First Step with U.S. Steel v. Hoge

I.

INTRODUCTION

The existence of methane gas in coalbeds has long been acknowledged, but the question of its ownership has only recently been
brought to the forefront due to its newfound value as a potential
energy resource. In December, 1983, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court rendered a decision on the issue of ownership of coalbed gas
in U.S. Steel v. Hoge.1 The court found the coal owner to have
exclusive ownership of the coalbed gas under the coal severance
grant at issue in the case.2 The question was one of first impression
in the state, and Hoge has become the leading case on point in the
nation. Because of the lack of clear legal precedent, the litigation
has provided an opportunity for commentators from the legal profession, the scientific community and the industry to offer approaches to the resolution of the ownership question. 3
The trial court, recognizing the complexity of the issue, held exhaustive hearings and made extensive findings of fact before entering a final decree quieting title in the landowner and his gas
lessee.4 The superior court affirmed after a lengthy legal analysis,
1. 503 Pa. 140, 468 A.2d 1380 (1983).
2. Id. at 150, 468 A.2d at 1385.
3. See,e .g., Bowles, Coalbed Gas: Present Status of Ownership Issue and Other Legal
Considerations,1 E. MIN. L. INST. 7-1 (1980); Farnell, Methane Gas Ownership:A Proposed
Solution for Alabama, 33 ALA. L. REv. 521 (1982); Kemp, Recent Developments in the Ownership & Right to Extract Coalbed Gas, THE LANDMAN, Nov. 1982, at 6; Mutchler & Sachse,
Legal Aspects of Gas from Coalbeds (paper presented at SPE/DOE Symposium on Unconventional Gas Recovery held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, May 18-21, 1980) (SPE/DOE
#8947); Ingram, Coalbed Gas: Present Status of Ownership Issue and Other Legal Considerations - Appendix, 1 E. MIN. L. INST. 7-29 (1980); Bowles, Surface and Subsurface Conflicts, 2 E. MIN. L. INsT. 24.1 (1981); Olson, Coalbed Methane: Legal ConsiderationsAffecting Its Development as an Energy Resource, 13 TULSA L.J. 377 (1978).
4. U.S. Steel v. Hoge, 6 Pa. D. & C.3d 64 (1980) (preliminary order granting temporary
injunction), No. 682, slip op. (Ct. C.P. Greene County, Sept. 29, 1980) (final order granting
permanent injunction against hydrofracturing and quieting title in landowners and their gas
lessee), aff'd, 304 Pa. Super. 182, 450 A.2d 162 (1982), revd, 503 Pa. 140, 468 A.2d 1380
(1983). The chancellor in the Court of Common Pleas was President Judge Toothman. A
reprint of Judge Toothman's opinion and the final decree can be found in Ingram, supra
note 3, at 7-29.
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stating that it appeared to be a clear victory for the landowner and
his gas lessee. The supreme court reversed, however, and ordered
a decree quieting title exclusively in the coal owner.0 What has
evolved is a fully developed record of the facts and legal analysis
supplemented by a rich collection of commentary by different sectors of the community.
The supreme court condensed the issue to a simple finding of
intent by construing the coal severance grant using standard legal
principles. The dissent criticized the parties and amicus briefs for
arguing who should own the gas, when the issue before the court
was who does own the gas.7 The superior court had earlier voiced a
similar complaint, stating that although the suit had been brought
in equity, it was satisfied that equitable considerations did not
mandate a result different from one reached using standard legal
principles."
If Hoge merely involves a simple finding of intent, why then all
the debate? Obviously even supreme court justices can differ on
the finding of intent.9 The focus, however, of much criticism by
commentators has been the insufficiency of the application of such
a standard legal doctrine to a controversy of this type. Mineral law
historically has been shaped in part by consideration of the public
interest. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court itself stated in Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon" that mineral rights exist as a necessity: such rights must be adjusted and protected as required."
The Chartiers court pointed out that coal and gas are essential to
our common comfort and prosperity, 2 and in Pennsylvania, a state
which abounds with such resources, the question of rights becomes
of a quasi-public character."
The final victory for the coal owner may not seem foreseeable
after heavy setbacks at the trial and appeals court levels, but examination of the extensive writings on the issue provides insight
into what factors influence this area of law and will work to vindi5. 304 Pa. Super. 182, 201, 450 A.2d 162, 172.
6. 503 Pa. at 150, 468 A.2d at 1385.
7. Id. at 159, 468 A.2d at 1390 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
8. 304 Pa. Super. at 204, 450 A.2d at 173.
9. 503 Pa. 140, 468 A.2d 1380. The majority found that the intent of the parties was to
vest exclusive ownership of the coalbed gas in the owner of the coal, while the dissent found
joint ownership between the coal owner and gas lessee.
10. 152 Pa. 286, 294, 25 A. 597, 599 (1893).
11. Id. at 297, 25 A. at 599.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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cate the court's decision. This comment will present the background of the issue and case, review the criticism of the decisions
and set forth the social and economic perspective in which the supreme court decision in fact appears both appropriate and
foreseeable.
II.

CHARACTERISTICS OF COALBED

GAS

Historically regarded as valueless and a hazard to mining,
coalbed gas' has newfound value as a potential energy resource.1 5
Experiments conducted by the coal companies, including U.S.
Steel, and the federal government to determine the technological
and economic feasibility of degasifying coal seams in advance of
mining paint a bright picture.' Much interest in the development
of coalbed gas has ensued in light of the vast reserves, the rising
costs of natural gas and the additional benefits accruing to the
mining operation.
The U.S. Department of Energy has estimated that there may be
as much as 850 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of methane available in the
nation's coalbeds.' 7 This is roughly equivalent to the estimate of
the natural gas reserves in the United States by the U.S. Geological Survey.' 8 Coalbed gas is similar in composition and heating
value to conventional natural gas and can be added directly to
commercial pipelines without remedial processing.' 9 Coalbed gas
represents only one percent of the energy found in the coal seam;
coal itself is the remaining ninety-nine percent.' Degasification of
14. A good general description of coalbed gas is found in Kemp, supra note 3, at 6:
Coalbed gas is present in all coalbeds and is formed by biochemical and physical
processes during the conversion of accumulated plant material into coal. Of the mixture of gasses termed "coalbed gas," methane constitutes 80 percent to 99 percent.
Coalbed gas is similar in nature to natural gas in physical and chemical properties
and can be interchanged with natural gas, added directly to natural gas pipelines,
used as a chemical feedstock, converted to liquid natural gas (LNG), burned as a
boiler or process-heating fuel, or used in gas turbines for generating electricity ....
Coalbed gas is contained in coal fractures and also is adsorbed on the micropore surfaces of even the tiniest piece of coal, and is released when confining pressure is
released.
Id.

15. Deul & Kim, Methane in Coal: From Liability to Asset, 61

MINING CONGRESS J.,

Nov. 1975 at 28.
16. Id.
17.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, NATIONAL GAS SURVEY, NONCONVENTIONAL

8 (1978).
18. Id. at 8, 14.
19. Deul & Kim, supra note 15, at 30.
20. Hoge, 503 Pa. 140, 145-46, 468 A.2d 1380, 1383.

NATURAL GAS RESOURCES
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the coal strata is also undertaken in advance of mining to increase
the safety and productivity of the mining operation and to reduce
1
2
ventilation costs.

Technology for coalbed gas recovery is ready for the marketplace, but standing as a hindrance to full development are the
questions of ownership and the right to develop the coalbed gas in
situations where the coal and gas rights are held by different parties.22 This issue has been addressed by the federal government, 3
and one state has passed legislation. 2 The majority of the states
have not addressed the issue, however, and can expect to see it
litigated. Such was the case in Pennsylvania.26
III.

U.S. Steel v. Hoge

In August, 1977, the appellant, United States Steel Corporation
(U.S. Steel), began operations to recover coal from the Pittsburgh
coal seam. 26 The turn of the century deed under which it claimed
ownership of the coal underlying a certain tract of land in Greene
County gave the coal owner "all rights and privileges necessary and
useful in the mining of the coal" along with the "right of ventila-

tion. 12 7 The landowners reserved the right to "drill and operate

through said coal for oil and gas without being held liable for damages."' 28 The appellees were the current surface landowners and

their oil and gas lessee. 29 The grants to the gas lessee included "all
of the oil and gas and all of the constituents of either in and
21. Deul & Kim, supra note 15, at 28.
22. Coal-Seam Gas Recovery is Ready For The Marketplace, CHEMICAL ENGINEERING,
April 4, 1983, at 39.
23. See Kemp, supra note 3, at 13. See also Solicitor's Opinion, Ownership of and
Right to Extract Coalbed Gas in FederalCoal Deposits, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, M-36935
(May 12, 1981) (methane was included in a Congressional reservation of oil and gas; opinion
cites U.S. Steel. v. Hoge). See also Olson, infra note 112, at 362 (Congress has included
coalbed methane in the category of high cost natural gas in Section 107 of the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978).
24. See Bowles, supra note 3, at 7.25 (Va. Code § 55-154.1 vests ownership of coalbed
gas in the surface owner in all cases of severances executed after January 1, 1978. However,
no ownership rights are fixed for severances granted before January 1, 1978).
25. See Olson, supra note 3, at 378 n.6 (General Assembly of Pennsylvania H.R. 181,
1977 Session. The proposed bill declared that all methane under the surface of land in the
Commonwealth is property of the Commonwealth. The bill created a State Methane Commission with authority to license and regulate commercial recovery of coalbed methane. The
bill did not pass.).
26. 503 Pa. at 144, 468 A.2d at 1381.
27. Id. at 144, 468 A.2d at 1382.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 144, 468 A.2d at 1381-82.
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under" the surface.30
In January of 1978, drilling commenced on the two tracts specifically to recover coalbed gas contained in the underlying Pittsburgh
coal seam.3 1 It was the gas lessee's apparent intention to increase
production of the wells through the use of a hydrofracturing
3
process. 1
Following this action, the Court of Common Pleas of Greene
County granted the preliminary injunction sought by U.S. Steel to
prevent alleged irreparable injury and damage to the coal seam if
hydrofracturing techniques were implemented.3 3 In a consolidated
action in equity, U.S. Steel also sought a determination of ownership of the coalbed gas and the right to develop it in the portion of
the Pittsburgh coal seam underlying the two tracts. 4 The court
quieted title in the coalbed gas in the landowners and their gas
35
lessee, permitting them to drill for coalbed gas in the coal seam.
36
Use of any hydrofracturing techniques however, was prohibited.
Additionally, the court determined that U.S. Steel had the right to
any coalbed gas liberated during the ventilation necessary for safe
37
operation of the mine.
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, U.S. Steel advanced four arguments based on the severance deed plus a fifth
based on public policy which would resolve the question of ownership of coalbed gas in favor of the owner of the coal severance. 3s
The court prefaced its opinion by stating that rules of statutory
30. Id. at 144, 468 A.2d 1382.
31. Id.
32. Id. Hydrofracturing is a production stimulation technique where existing natural
fractures in the coal seam are expanded by the application of hydraulic pressure and the
controlled injection of gelled water into the coal. Sand grains in the gelled water prop open
the fractures after the pressure is released. Hydraulic stimulation increases the permeability
of the coal, extends the collection radius, and increases exposed surface areas. These factors
control the rate of degasification of the coal. Deul & Kim, supra note 15, at 28.
33. 6 Pa. D. & C.3d 64 (1980) (preliminary order granting temporary injunction).
34. U.S. Steel v. Hoge, No. 682, slip op. (Ct. C.P. Greene County, Sept. 29, 1980).
35. Id. at 48.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 304 Pa. Super. 182, 450 A.2d 162. U.S. Steel filed timely exceptions to Judge
Toothman's decree of September 29, 1980. Superior Court President Judge Cercone wrote
the opinion for a panel consisting of himself, Judge Brosky and Judge Hoffman. Id. at 18889, 450 A.2d at 165. The superior court dismissed U.S. Steel's attempt to widen the scope of
review to include the chancellor's findings of fact. Id. at 188, 450 A.2d at 165. The court
stated that it had independently reviewed the record and found that sufficient evidence was
adduced at trial to support all of the chancellor's findings of fact. Id. at 188 n.6, 450 A.2d at
165 n.6.
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construction require that the deed be considered in its entirety and
that the language be read in light of the conditions existing at the
time of execution. 9 Ambiguous language would be interpreted
most strongly against the drafter of the deed. 40 The court added
that rules of construction would not be used as a "magic formula"
for resolution of the dispute, asserting that the foremost considera41
tion is the intention of the parties.
The court first considered the argument that the severance grant
of a fee simple interest in the Pittsburgh vein of coal embraced
everything in the coal stratum."2 The court stated that coal ownership in Pennsylvania has been considered a corporeal hereditament
ever since the 1858 decision of Caldwell v. Fulton." But, as the
court pointed out, the Caldwell court, although it made reference
to "substrata," did not hold that a coal severance deed grants a fee
simple interest in the geological situs of that coal."
Disagreeing with U.S. Steel's reading of Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co.,' 5 Webber v. Vogel,"1 and Chartiers Block Coal
Co. v. Mellon,'7 the court stated that U.S. Steel had focused on
dictum therein which seemed to imply that ownership of coal was
ownership of the stratum in fact, with all rights analogous to land
ownership.' The court, however, preferred the reading of the cases
by commentators Craig and Myers who, the court explained, wrote
that the true subject of the conveyance is not the stratum but a
particular mineral substance.' 9 Pennsylvania law, the latter commentators point out, has recognized separate ownership of each
39. 304 Pa. Super. at 189, 450 A.2d at 165-66. See, e.g., In re Conveyance of Land
Belonging to City of DuBois, 461 Pa. 161, 335 A.2d 352 (1975); St. Michael & Archangel
Russ. O.G. Cath. Church v. Uhniat, 451 Pa. 176, 301 A.2d 655 (1973).
40. 304 Pa. Super. at 189, 450 A.2d at 166. See, e.g., New Charter Coal Co. v. McKee,
411 Pa. 307, 191 A.2d 830 (1963); Lacy v. Montgomery, 181 Pa. Super. 640, 124 A.2d 492
(1956).
41. 304 Pa. Super. at 189, 450 A.2d at 166.
42. Id. at 190, 450 A.2d at 166.
43. Id. In Caldwell v. Fulton, 31 Pa. 475 (1858), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that coal is land, that the grantor granted the entire dominion over the coal to the grantee
and did not reserve anything to himself. Therefore this was not a mere license to take coal
but a corporeal hereditament. Id. at 481.
44. 304 Pa. Super. at 190 n.7, 450 A.2d at 166 n.7.
45. 143 Pa. 293, 22 A. 1035 (1891).
46. 189 Pa. 156, 42 A. 4 (1899).
47. 152 Pa. 286, 25 A. 597 (1893).
48. 304 Pa. Super. at 192, 450 A.2d at 167.
49. Id. at 195, 450 A.2d at 168. See Craig & Myers, Ownership of 'Methane Gas in
Coalbeds, 24 ROCKY MT. MIN. INST. 767, 774 (1978).
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constituent of a given tract of land. 0
The second argument considered by the court was that coalbed
gas and coal are so intimately intermingled as to be considered essentially different aspects of the same substance. 51 U.S. Steel argued that this was common knowledge at the time the severance
deed was executed.5 2 The court, however, agreed with the chancellor's findings that this was not common knowledge, citing a 1930's
geology authority for the hypothesis that coalbed gas was natural
53
gas which had migrated and become trapped in the coal.
Turning to the legal background at the time of the execution of
the coal severance deed, the court cited the Dunham rule54 which,
the court explained, provides that natural gas is not classified as a
mineral and so does not pass under a grant severing coal and minerals from the surface tract. 5 Taking into account the similarity of
composition of coalbed gas and natural gas, and that the Dunham
rule was in existence before the execution of the deed, the court
56
found no reason not to apply the Dunham rule by analogy.
50. Craig & Myers, supra note 49, at 774.
51. 304 Pa. Super. at 195, 450 A.2d at 168. U.S. Steel's full argument was that the
coalbed gas and coal are so intimately intermingled that there was no physical separateness
upon which to base individual ownership. Contrary to the chancellor's finding of fact No. 24,
U.S. Steel argued that coalbed gas, being mostly adsorbed to the coal, should be properly
characterized as an intrinsic part of the coal. Brief for Appellant at 23-24, U.S. Steel v.
Hoge, 304 Pa. Super. 182, 450 A.2d 162 (1982).
52. 304 Pa. Super. at 195, 450 A.2d at 168-69. U.S. Steel argued that the popular identification of coalbed gas is best ascertained by the custom and usage within the coal, oil and
gas industries. U.S. Steel pointed out that coalbed gas has never been considered in studies
of natural gas deposits in Pennsylvania by the Pennsylvania Bureau of Topography and
Geological Survey. Also, the record shows that grantors and grantees of coal lands in Greene
County viewed an oil and gas reservation as referring to oil and gas underlying the vein of
coal . Brief for Appellant at 26-31, U.S. Steel v. Hoge, 304 Pa. Super. 182, 450 A.2d 162
(1982).
53. 304 Pa. Super. at 195 n.9, 450 A.2d at 169 n.9. See Price & Headlee, Physical and
Chemical Propertiesof Natural Gas in West Virginia, 9 W. VA. GEOL. SURV. 180 (1937).
54. 304 Pa. Super. at 196, 450 A.2d at 169. See Dunham & Shortt v. Kirkpatrick, 101
Pa. 36, 47 A.R. 696 (1882). In Dunham, the court held that a deed granting "timber and all
minerals" did not include petroleum, the existence of which was unknown at the execution
of the deed. The court concluded that the word "minerals" was used in its ordinary, everyday meaning and so was not understood to encompass petroleum. Id. at 44. The Dunham
rule is peculiar to the law of Pennsylvania.
55. 304 Pa. Super. at 196, 450 A.2d at 169. See Silver v. Bush, 213 Pa. 195, 62 A. 832
(1905), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied the Dunham rule to natural gas.
56. 304 Pa. Super. at 196, 450 A.2d at 169. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court does not
discuss the Dunham rule although it does cite to the case for other propositions. Id. The
court states instead that natural gas is a mineral in Pennsylvania. It is the opinion of this
writer that the superior court incorrectly applied the Dunham rule to the more narrow grant
of only coal in Hoge, whereas the Dunham rule was originally based on the construction of a
grant of "minerals."

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 23:735

In its third argument, U.S. Steel focused on the reservation in
the grantor of the right to drill through the coal seam.5 7 U.S. Steel
had asserted that this reservation was a right of access to oil and
gas deposits underlying the coal and not a right to recover gas from
the coal seam. 8 The court, however, dismissed the argument by
calling attention to the historical practice of the oil and gas industry to take gas from whatever stratum in which it is found. The
court pointed out that the chancellor had found numerous cases of
wells producing coalbed gas, some for substantial periods of time
and some drilled specifically for that purpose. 59 Additionally, the
court stated that the reservation to drill through coal, read strictly
against the grantor, constituted nothing more than an attempt to
avoid liability for damages to the coal if drilling through the seam
became necessary to gain access to gas.60
The court next considered U.S. Steel's argument that the right
to ventilation conferred on the owner of the coal severance is evidence of a property right in the gas."' The court agreed with the
chancellor's conclusion that the right to ventilate the mine creates
no property right in the coal owner except to the extent of recovery
of coalbed gas which is released incident to the mining operation. 2
The court thus concluded that the coal owner is entitled only to
the use or profits from the sale of coalbed gas which it3 reduces to
its possession incident to the ventilation of the mine.
U.S. Steel's fifth argument was a public policy argument demanding rational exploitation of energy resources. U.S. Steel asserted that the important consideration was the low cost, efficient
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. U.S. Steel argued that the court had misread the evidence as to the instances
and circumstances under which gas has been produced from the coal vein. Carnegie Natural
Gas, a subsidiary of U.S. Steel, has produced coalbed gas from only eight out of over nine
hundred wells drilled in Greene and Washington Counties between 1920 and 1974. There
was no evidence that coal owners were notified of such operations. Even with the passage of
the Gas Operations Act in 1955, no notice of the intent to recover coalbed gas is required by
law. Hence, the coal owners' failure to contest the taking of the gas is not indicative of an
acceptance of the gas lessee's claim to the gas. Brief for Appellant at 26-31, U.S. Steel v.
Hoge, 304 Pa. Super. 182, 450 A.2d 162 (1982). See infra note 104 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Gas Operations Act.
60. 304 Pa. Super. at 197-98, 450 A.2d at 170.
61. Id. at 198, 450 A.2d at 170. More specifically, U.S. Steel argued that the grant of a
right of ventilation is evidence of the surface owner's intent to dispose of the gas and surrender all claims to the gas. Brief for Appellant at 20-21, U.S. Steel v. Hoge, 304 Pa. Super.
182, 450 A.2d 162 (1982).
62. 304 Pa. Super. at 201, 450 A.2d at 172 (1982).
63. Id. at 202, 450 A.2d at 172.
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production of all resources.64 The coal owner would have the requisite interest in both coal and coalbed gas to insure maximum utilization of both resources. Though characterizing the argument as
appealing, the court nonetheless insisted that "equity follows the
law,"'6 5 and, considering the legal and factual background at the
time of execution of the severance deed, concluded that it could
not hold that the parties had intended that coalbed gas pass under
the coal deed. Indeed, it appeared to the court to be the opposite. 66
Concluding, the court stated that the cases seemed to indicate 6 a7
"clear victory" for the surface owners and their oil and gas lessee,
and indicated satisfaction that the proffered equitable considerations did not mandate a different result than the one reached using
the applicable legal principles.6 8
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, reversed the judgment of the superior court and remanded to the Court of Common
Pleas of Greene County for entry of a final decree quieting title in
U.S. Steel.69 In an opinion by Justice Zappala, the court placed
exclusive ownership of coalbed gas found in the coal seam in the
coal owner. The court's analysis rested on consideration of the
characteristics, origins, and historical development of coalbed
gas.70 Although gas is fugacious, according to Pennsylvania law, it
is part of the property for the time it is in place there.7 Recognizing this principle, the court stated that as a general rule, whoever
has title to the property in which the gas is resting owns the gas.'
In this case, therefore, the coal owner was held to own the coalbed
gas as long as it remained within his property and exclusive
control. 3
The court similarly recognized that any owner may allow others
64. Id. at 202-03, 450 A.2d at 172-73. See Mutchler & Sachse, Legal Aspects of
Coalbed Gas, 33 J. PETROLEUM TECH., October 1981, at 1861.
65. 304 Pa. Super. at 203, 450 A.2d at 173.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 202, 450 A.2d at 172.
68. Id.
69. 503 Pa. at 150, 468 A.2d at 1385.
70. Id. at 145-46, 468 A.2d 1382.
71. Id. at 146, 468 A.2d 1383. See Hamilton v. Foster, 272 Pa. 95, 102, 116 A. 50, 52-53
(1922).
72. 503 Pa. at 147, 468 A.2d at 1383 (citing Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co.
v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 249, 18 A. 724, 725 (1889) (governing principle of gas ownership is
that it "belong[s] to the owner of the land ... so long as [it is] in it and are subject to ...
control; but when [it] escapes ... or come[s] under another's control, the title of the former
owner is gone); Kier v. Peterson, 41 Pa. 357 (1862) (owner of subterranean salt entitled to
oil commingled with it)).
73. 503 Pa. at 147, 468 A.2d at 1383.
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certain rights to his property.74 In this case, the grantor of the coal
reserved the right to "drill and operate through said coal for oil
and gas . . . 75To determine the extent of these rights, the court
looked to the language of the deed in its entirety, in light of the
conditions existing at the time of execution, so as to give effect to
the intention of the parties.76 Based on findings of fact by the
chancellor in the court of common pleas, the court found that it
would be inconceivable that the parties intended all gas to be reserved despite the use of the unrestricted term "gas. ' 77 Implicit in
the reservation of "oil and gas," the court asserted, was the understanding that it included that which was generally known to be
commercially exploitable: the oil and natural gas found in strata
deeper than the coal.7 It would strain credulity, the court submitted, to believe that the grantor would retain the right to a valueless
gas with the attendant responsibility for its dangerous nature.7"
Therefore, the court found that the reservation did not affect the
coal owner's exclusive right to the coalbed gas found within its coal
seam.80

Justice Flaherty filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice
Hutchinson joined. The dissent would have affirmed the lower
court's permanent injunction against the use of hydrofracturing,
but would have modified the order to the extent that it would vest
title in both the surface owners and the coal owner.8 ' The dissent
agreed that as long as the coalbed gas remained within the coal
seam it was the property of the owner of the seam.8 2 In construing
the reservation in the original grant of coal, however, the dissenting Justices found that the use of the unrestricted term "gas" included coalbed gas as a recoverable gas.8 3 They concluded therefore that the coal owner does not have exclusive ownership of the
coalbed gas;8 4 the surface owner, or his gas lessee would, under the
dissenting opinion, be permitted to so much of the gas present and
extractable through drilling efforts within the constraint of not un74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

147-48, 468 A.2d
148, 468 A.2d at
148, 468 A.2d at
150, 468 A.2d at

at 1384.
1384.
1384-85.
1385.

(Flaherty, J., dissenting).
at 154-57, 468 A.2d at 1389-90 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
at 158, 468 A.2d at 1389-90 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
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reasonably impairing or rendering useless the coal estate. 5 Concluding, the dissent criticized the parties' arguments concerning
who should own the coal. 6 Instead, the dissenting Justices asserted, the issue before the court was who does own the coal under
the language of a particular coal severance deed.87 According to
Justice Flaherty, whether the rights were allocated in a way that is
today desirable was not for the court to decide. 8
IV.

CRITICAL TREATMENT OF THE COALBED GAS OWNERSHIP ISSUE

Criticism by commentators on this issue has most often focused
on the inadequacy of standard legal doctrines to resolve controversies of the type involved in Hoge, and the lack of true protection of
the coal fee.
The determinant legal doctrine in Hoge was the finding of intent, a common subject for discussion and dissection. The supreme
court cited McGinley, 89 a commentator who finds the scales heavily
tipped in favor of the coal owner if the ultimate criteria is intent.9 0
McGinley questions whether a grantor would convey coalbed gas of
then negative value under a gas lease, knowing that the extraction
would make the more valuable coal a more difficult and less profitable operation.9 1 Similarly, he finds it difficult to believe that the
gas lessee intended to purchase the coalbed gas with the attendent
responsibilities for damages arising from explosions.9 2 As a practical matter, coal operators have always borne responsibility for the
hazards of coalbed gas without objection by the gas industry;9 3
thus it is logical, McGinley submits, to expect that the benefits are
94
concomitant with the responsibilities for the disadvantages. McGinley goes on to state, however, that whatever the parties expectations as to coalbed gas as a known nuisance, commercial development of coalbed gas was never contemplated by the parties.9 5 In
such instances he suggests that further negotiations for compensa85. Id. at 159, 468 A.2d 1385 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 159-60, 468 A.2d 1390 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. McGinley, Legal Problems Relating to Ownership of Gas Found in Coal Deposits,
80 W. VA. L. REv. 369 (1978).
90. Id. at 390.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 391.
94. Id. at 391-92.
95. Id.
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tion between the surface owner and the 'coal owner would be
appropriate. 6
The earliest commentator on coalbed gas ownership, C.C. Williams, Jr., writing contemporaneously with the conveyance, believed that "any notions about the intended scope of the severance
. . . would have to be sheerest guesswork. ' 97 He doubted that
there was ever a meeting of minds on the subject.9 8 Principle, precedent, and doctrine are found in equipoise in this controversy, so
in the absence of direct authority, Williams maintained that it
should resolve down to a question of public policy. 9 It was his
opinion that the coal operator in the pursuit of safety should be
encouraged to experiment with exploitation of coalbed gas and, if
forced to an ultimate choice between surface or coal owner, sound
policy would favor the coal owner.' 0° Williams also observed that
often when legal doctrine is stagnant, the mechanical arts continue
to advance far beyond the existing technical rules. It is the task of
the law to "guide this current innovation into safe channels."1 "1
One of the more serious criticisms which may be leveled against
the trial and appellate court opinions is their failure to perceive
the lack of true protection of the coal fee under existing Pennsylvania statutes once a coal seam has become target strata for drilling. The vulnerability of the coal seam was recognized by Judge
Toothman in the trial court' 0 2 in discussing the insufficient protection provided to the coal owner under the Gas Operation, WellDrilling, Petroleum and Coal Mining Act (Gas Operations Act)."0 '
However, satisfied that the right to appeal to the court of common
pleas from the Environmental Hearing Board overcame the lack of
true protection under the Act as applied by the Department of Environmental Resources (DER), Judge Toothman stated that this
would insure that "no coal lands suffer, . . . that [the coal seam]

becomes a horizontal pegboard for the petroleum industry
"I" In reality, however, the coal owner is so limited under the
96. Id.
97. Williams, On Leasing Gas From Coal Seams, 47 W. VA. L.Q. 211, 226 (1941).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 227.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. U.S. Steel v. Hoge, No. 682, slip op. at 45 (Ct. C.P. Greene County Sept. 29,
1980), afl'd, 304 Pa. Super. 182, 450 A.2d 162 (1982), rev'd, 503 Pa. 140, 468 A.2d 1360
(1983).
103. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 2101-2602 (Purdon 1966).
104. U.S. Steel v. Hoge, No. 682, slip op. at 46.
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administrative procedure that, in effect, he must litigate to prevent
his seam from gaining such an undesired condition. 10 5
A recent decision concerning denial of an application for an offset well, Einsig v. Pennsylvania Mines Corp.,00 demonstrates the
limited review allowed the DER. The court held that the DER
could not issue or deny a permit on the basis of which private
party, the coal owner or gas developer, would be more harmed financially. 10 7 The court stated that once the DER determines that
the well will not unduly interfere with or endanger the mine, if the
parties cannot agree on a suitable location for the well, then the
DER has authority under the Act to impose a determination of
where but not whether the well may be drilled.10 8 The DER cannot
find that the well unduly interferes with the mine unless there is
adequate quantitative evidence establishing the amount of coal
rendered unmineable from the drilling and sufficient evidence on
additional costs.' 0 9 This may be a substantial hurdle in the case of
wells drilled for coalbed gas in advance of mining in locations
where the coal owner may not be able to provide the specific quantitative evidence to carry the burden of proof.
Additionally, one commentator has pointed out that while Judge
Toothman in the trial court had asserted that coal owners could
receive just compensation for any deprivation, diminution or unreasonable taking, the Gas Operations Act does not require compensation for coal pillars, left around gas wells as a safety device
105.

See Ingram, supra note 3, at 32. The Gas Operations Act, PA STAT. ANN. tit. 52,

§§ 2101-2504, sets out a permit procedure such that a well operator must have a plat prepared showing the political subdivision and county, name of lessor or landowner, name of
owner or operator of all known underlying workable coal seams, proposed location of the
well, proposed angle and direction of the well, and the indentification number of the well.
This information is to be forwarded by registered mail to the division which in turn shall
notify by registered mail the landowner and owner of any coal seams. The coal operator
then has ten days to file an objection and propose an alternate location if possible. If no
objection is raised, the permit is granted. Id. at § 2201(a). Upon objection, a hearing is
scheduled. If the parties fail to agree on a location, the division shall by appropriate order
determine a location. A drilling permit is promptly issued. Id. at § 2202(b). The well operator has a duty to keep a log of all coal seams penetrated and the depth at which all oil, gas
and water are encountered. A copy of the log shall be furnished to the division within thirty
days after completion of the well. Id. at § 2201(b).
106. 69 Pa. Commw. 351, 452 A.2d 558 (1982). In Einsig, a permit granted by the
Department of Environmental Resources for drilling of an offset well was found to be improperly revoked by the Environmental Hearing Board on the basis of insufficient evidence
that the well would unduly interfere with the mine. Id. at 362, 452 A.2d at 564.
107. Id. at 368, 452 A.2d at 567.
108. Id. at 369, 452 A.2d at 567.
109. Id. at 361-62, 452 A.2d at 563.
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and required under Pennsylvania law. 11 0 The additional wells for
retrieval of coalbed gas, which -would be needed given the restriction on hydrofracturing, would have required substantial amounts
of coal to be left in place; the issue of compensation for such losses
thus would have to be litigated in every case.
The coal owner will find little protection under the Gas Operations Act. If his coal seam were to become the target horizon, he
would have to turn additional attention to every drilling permit
and continually object, and possibly litigate, in order to preserve
the minability of his seam. Fortunately, the threat of an onslaught
of coalbed gas drilling permits has been eliminated by vesting exclusive ownership of coalbed gas in the coal owner.

V.

U.S. Steel v. Hoge

FROM A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC

PERSPECTIVE

Coalbed gas can provide a valuable supplement to the nation's
supply of natural gas. It can do so in a rational and efficient manner, however, only after clarification of the ownership issue is
achieved in order to eliminate the legal uncertainty now hindering
development. In U.S. Steel v. Hoge, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has taken an important-albeit tenuous-first step toward
this goal.
Though Hoge added some clarity to the controversy by vesting
exclusive ownership of coalbed gas in the owner of the coal, its disclaiming of public policy arguments was unfortunate; both social
and economic considerations tend to support the result in Hoge
and, in addition, demonstrate the need for further clarification
that coalbed gas ownership is securely vested in the coal owner. An
interesting assortment of interests will be served by such clarification: enhanced mine safety, conservation, and expansion of natural
resources by way of enhanced entreprenurial opportunity.
In Pennsylvania, an important coal producing state, safety of
coal miners is of paramount importance."' The volume of state
statutes addressing mining reflects the state's concern not only
with protection of coal as a resource, but also the protection of the
individuals who extract it. The existence of methane gas consti110. Ingram, supra note 51, at 32. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 2203 (Purdon 1966).
See infra text accompanying note 125.
111. In addition to the state, the Congress declared in the Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1976): "The first priority and concern of all the
coal mining industry must be the health and safety of its most precious resource-the
miner." Id. at § 801(a).
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tutes the most critical safety hazard. Ignitions and explosions are
responsible for the deaths of many miners each year; the number
of fatalities has increased as deeper, gassier coal seams are
14
mined.' 12 State statutes 1 3 coupled with strict federal regulations
impose rigorous standards to insure the safety of the miners.
Comprehensive federal safety regulations require that the concentration of methane at the coal face be limited to one percent. 1 5
If it exceeds this value, mining must stop until ventilation dilutes
the methane to an acceptable level."16 Once diluted, methane constitutes less than one percent of the ventilation exhaust." 7 At this
point it is unrecoverable and benefits no one. Degasifying in advance of mining, although initially experimented with to improve
mine safety, has also produced methane in marketable quantities." 8 Additionally, degasifying improves productivity of the mining operation by reducing downtime due to gas concentrations and
allows more efficient use of continuous mining machines." 9
The most successful methods of degasification include the use of
large diameter vertical boreholes,"10 advance mine shafts' 2 ' and
horizontal boreholes at the face of the seam.'2 2 All of these methods require the coal owner's cooperation. In order to effect efficient
degasification, the coal owner should have the control necessary to
coordinate degasifying with his mining operations. Coordination
aside, the coal mine operator has always borne the primary responsibility for the safety of the miners; degasification thus presents an
opportunity to encourage the coal owner to improve mine safety
with economic incentives. The importance of clarification of
coalbed gas ownership is clearly a prerequisite to achieving these
dual goals.
In addition to these latter goals, securing full ownership of
coalbed gas in the coal owner will work in a general fashion toward
conservation of natural resources. As evident from its oil and gas
112. , Olson, Development of Coalbed Gas As An Energy Source, 4 ENERGY SOURCE
353, 356 (1979).
113. See Anthracite Coal Mine Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 70.501-70.524 (1965);
Bituminous Coal Mine Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 701.242-701.250 (1961).
114. Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1976).
115. Id. at § 863(h)(1).
116. Id. at § 863(h)(2).
117. Deul & Kim, supra note 15, at 28.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 31.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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conservation statute, 2 3 Pennsylvania has adopted a firm policy endorsing such conservation. The statute, though not applicable to
coalbed gas, states plainly that waste of oil and gas is prohibited." '
That the conservation goal cannot be achieved until ownership
of coalbed gas is more firmly clarified is evidenced from what
would have been the results of a sustained Hoge superior court ruling. Pennsylvania statutes require that coal pillars be left in place
around gas well boreholes to prevent methane migration into the
affected mine.1 25 In recognition of this important safety precaution,
the Hoge superior court had restricted the gas lessee's use of
hydrofracturing. Under such a restriction, the alternative practice
for the surface driller would be to drill more wells. Notwithstanding the statutory requirement demanding coal pillars for safety,
with every new well comes added risk of methane seepage. The
practical result of such a state of affairs is to increase risk to the
miners and to leave more coal in place and unminable; thus coal is
wasted as a safety material to prevent gas seepage, and gas is
wasted as coal owners, likewise in the name of safety, continue to
ventilate their mines. Had the superior court holding in Hoge been
sustained, and had ownership of coalbed gas been vested in the
grantor/driller, conservation and safety interests would have been
hopelessly at odds. One way to reconcile safety and conservation
interests is to encourage the coal owner to degasify in advance of
mining. This one interested party can make the requisite decisions
for maximum utilization of both resources. This will reduce the
needless waste of natural resources while improving mine safety.
Coalbed gas, as suggested above, can supplement the nation's energy supplies. Its current wasting is unconscionable in light of the
nation's energy policy, 2 " a vital element of which is a commitment
to developing various sources of energy to reduce dependence on
foreign sources. 2 7 Coalbed gas can make a significant contribution
toward this goal, however, only if incentives are available to accelerate development. 2 8 Clarification of the ownership issue is needed
to eliminate the legal uncertainty now hindering development; sim123. PA.

STAT. ANN. tit. 58, §§ 401-19 (Purdon 1966).
124. Id. at § 404.
125. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 2101 (Purdon 1966).
126. Olson, supra note 3, at 404. The federal government is committed to developing
new sources of energy as the activities of the Department of Energy demonstrate. Id.
127. Id.
128. Olson, supra note 112, at 363. Olson maintains that coalbed gas can make a major
contribution toward meeting the nation's energy needs at the most significant time, but only
if incentives are made available now. Id.
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ple rules easily administered are best suited for that purpose. 12 9
Safety, conservation and development with an eye to future needs
can be achieved by placing the burdens and the advantages in the
hands of one party: the coal owner.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In Pennsylvania after U.S. Steel v. Hoge, exclusive'ownership of
coalbed gas rests in the owner of the coal for grants of the involved
time and type, barring a clear expression otherwise. However, by
restricting the holding to the construction of a particular grant using conventional legal principles and disclaiming any policy arguments, the supreme court has limited its holding, thus allowing
much flexibility for prospective distinguishable fact situations.
The Hoge case as it originally stood in the superior court, with
essentially a division of ownership (gas lessee owns the gas except
that which the coal owner ventilates and brings under his possession), was fraught with unanswered questions. The case would
have been of little help in drawing the line between the two owners. The supreme court's holding of exclusive ownership prevents
the litigation which would have ensued to determine the reciprocal
servitudes of the coal fee and gas lease.
Intent of the parties, if a clear indication thereof could be discerned, would be dispositive of the issue. In Hoge, where intent
was so ambiguous that it had to be construed or negatively implied
from a number of factors, the court was provided with a situation
where it could have reasonably held for either party. It would be
logical to have expected the social and economic considerations to
sway the court toward a specific party. Still, the supreme court disclaimed any such public policy considerations. Those arguments
were presented to the court, however, and it is precisely those arguments which make the supreme court decision in Hoge both
foreseeable and appropriate.
Nancy P. Regelin
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Williams, supra note 97, at 225.

